The equilibrium model of Ellison, Fudenberg, and Möbius (2004) predicts that, if two competing auction sites are coexisting, then seller revenues and buyer-seller ratios on each site should be approximately equal. We examine these hypotheses using …eld experiments selling identical items on the eBay and Yahoo auction sites. We …nd evidence that is inconsistent with the equilibrium hypotheses, and suggest that the eBay-Yahoo market is in the process of tipping. Robust statistical tests indicate that revenues on eBay are consistently 20 to 70 percent higher than those on Yahoo. In addition, eBay auctions attract approximately two additional buyers per seller than equivalent Yahoo auctions. We also vary the Yahoo ending rule from a hard close to soft close but …nd no statistically or economically signi…cant changes in revenue or numbers of bidders. Moreover, the magnitude of the revenue and buyer-seller ratio disparities remain inconsistent with the notion of equilibrium coexistence even after accounting for various di¤erentiators between the sites.
With 95 million users listing more than 970 million items per year, eBay dominates the online auction industry (eBay, 2003) . In 2001, it held 64.3 percent of the US market share by revenue (Nielsen/NetRatings, 2001 ). eBay dwarfs its most notable rival, Yahoo, which maintains an auction service with less than 3 percent of the market share. 1 Yahoo is a small player on the way out of the US market or a long-run small player?
To answer these questions, one needs a theory which distinguishes between equilibrium and tipping behavior in competing auction sites. Ellison, Fudenberg and Möbius (2004) o¤er a model where the coexistence of sites with extremely unequal market shares is an equilibrium phenomenon. 2 A key testable implication of the model is that "the law of one price" should hold across competing sites; that is, eBay and Yahoo buyers should pay approximately the same amount for identical items. There is no reason to expect "the law of one price" to hold when a market is in the process of tipping. In fact, price disparity might signal a tipping market. A second implication of the theory is that the number of buyers attracted to identical items should be approximately the same between the two sites. Thus, to examine the tipping question, we conduct a series of …eld experiments with collectible coins to test the price and buyer-seller ratio equalization conditions following from the theoretical model of Ellison, et al. Our results suggest that this is a market in the process of tipping rather than 1 ubid.com and egghead.com had 15 and 4 percent of online auction market share in 2001, respectively. Both of these sites di¤er from eBay and Yahoo auction platforms. The ubid site provides business-to-buyer auction services only. The egghead site, which auctioned computers and computing accessories, was acquired by Amazon.com in December, 2001 and is currently operated as a retail site. 2 See also Ellison and Fudenberg (2002) for a more general treatment.
an equilibrium phenomenon-we …nd that "the law of one price" simply does not hold. Revenue comparisons consistently indicate that buyers on eBay pay 20 to 70 percent more and attract about two additional buyers per seller than their Yahoo counterparts for identical items. Moreover, the magnitude of these di¤erences is inconsistent with the predictions of equilibrium coexistence even after accounting for various "frictions" associated with buyers and sellers switching between the two sites. We supplement our experimental results with …eld data that con…rm not only the presence of the revenue and buyer-seller ratio disparity but also its persistence over time.
While our empirical work examines only one speci…c category in a sea of online products and services, the eBay-Yahoo tipping prediction has widespread relevance. First, Yahoo's persistent presence in the online auctions may provide a check on eBay's market power; Yahoo's exit, which would e¤ec-tively leave eBay to act as a monopolist, has obvious antitrust implications. Second, similar online auction "wars"are currently being fought on a global scale, as evidenced by China's recent emergence as an important battleground. Japanese, European and US experiences may be suggestive of the likely outcome in China and other developing countries. Third, online auctions are not unique in their tipping potential, and our work may closely relate to issues faced by these "two-sided markets" (see Rochet and Tirole, 2003) . For instance, our result may o¤er some predictive insight into the future market structure of online voice communications. An early entrant in that emerging market, Skype enjoys a substantial lead in market share over its leading rival, Googletalk. Indeed, eBay's recent $2.6+ billion acquisition of Skype may suggest that the auction giant believes that the lessons of the online auctions market may hold elsewhere. With a number of large competitors currently sharing the market, the online dating industry also has tipping potential. Will dating, like online auctions, end as "winner-takes-all", or can sites like Yahoo Personals and Match.com continue to coexist? Our paper, while not providing de…nitive answers to these intriguing questions, may shed valuable light on tipping markets beyond online auctions.
In addition to examining equilibrium coexistence, the …eld experiment data permit the empirical testing of auction style-related e¤ects, including ending rule and reserve value e¤ects. Indeed, by allowing the seller to change the ending rule from a …xed to a variable closing time, the Yahoo auction site o¤ers an ideal venue for reexamining the interesting observations about the e¤ects of ending rules …rst made by Roth and Ockenfels (2002) . In comparing bid timing for similar items sold on eBay and
Amazon auctions, which di¤er by closing rule, Roth and Ockenfels observed that hard-close auctions lead to considerably more late bidding in the form of "sniping" than do soft-close auctions. The theory model contained in Ockenfels and Roth (2006) rationalizes this di¤erence in bid timing and has the further implication that expected revenues should be higher in soft-close auctions. Of course, it is di¢ cult to test this implication using …eld data owing to the many di¤erences between the two auction platforms. Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth (2005) observe higher revenues and earlier bidding under a softclose rule compared to a hard-close rule in a series of controlled laboratory experiments. To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to study the e¤ects of ending rules using …eld experiments. Somewhat surprisingly, at least compared to our prior beliefs, we …nd that the choice of ending rule on the Yahoo site has no e¤ect on bid timing, number of bidders or auction revenues.
The theory model describes conditions for coexistence in an ideal environment where there are no switching costs, where reliability of the seller is not in question, and where the two sites are of identical quality-of course, none of this is likely to be exactly true in practice. Can these departures from the theory model explain the di¤erences in revenues and numbers of bidders we observe while preserving equilibrium coexistence? We consider the implications of adding each of these more realistic features to the basic model and come to the conclusion that the answer is no. We also conduct an additional study using …eld data which replicates the results of the …eld experiment. Taken together, our view is that the evidence supports the conclusion that US online auction platform competition is a market in the process of tipping.
The remainder of this section highlights some additional related work, both theoretical and empirical. Section 2 describes a version of the Ellison et al. model that we use to derive testable predictions.
Section 3 outlines the experimental design, motivated by the testable model predictions, while the fourth section describes key results of the statistical analysis as well as alternative explanations. Our conclusions appear in Section 5.
Related Literature
The question of when markets will tip dates back to the seminal paper of Schelling (1972 
Theory
In this section, we sketch the model of Ellison et al. (2004) and develop the main testable implications associated with equilibrium coexistence. The key economic intuition underlying equilibrium coexistence is the observation that there are two competing e¤ects which determine the site on which buyers and sellers will choose to locate. The …rst e¤ect, which Ellison et al. refer to as the "scale e¤ect,"
describes the idea that larger markets of buyers and sellers on a single site lead to higher surplus for all participants and thereby lead to concentration on a single site. The countervailing "market impact e¤ect"favors site multiplicity since competition from others on the same side of the market decreases the surplus of a given participant. That is, both buyers and sellers prefer to locate on a site where they compete with fewer other agents of the same type. Ellison et al. o¤er conditions under which these two e¤ects are o¤setting. They show that competing auction sites can have very unequal market shares yet coexist in equilibrium.
To see how these competing e¤ects lead to empirically testable predictions for behavior on rival auction sites such as eBay and Yahoo, consider the following version of the Ellison, et al. model. Two auction sites compete in a market consisting of B buyers and S sellers. Each seller wishes to sell one unit of some homogeneous product. Each buyer has unit demand for the good and a willingness to pay equal to v; where v is drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval. The objects are allocated via auctions on two competing online auction sites a 2 fe; yg, where e is a mnemonic for eBay and y is a mnemonic for Yahoo.
In the extensive form of the game, the buyers and sellers simultaneously choose the auction site a on which they will either buy or sell. All agents are assumed to "single-home"-they restrict their buying or selling activities to only one of the two sites. Let (B a ; S a ) denote the number of buyers and sellers choosing to participate on site a: After participants have chosen their preferred platform, buyers learn their valuations and uniform price auctions are conducted to allocate the goods on each site.
Given an allocation of buyers and sellers, the payo¤ to a seller is the price received for the item.
When B a buyers and S a sellers participate on site a and B a > S a + 1 (i.e. there is no excess supply for the homogeneous product), then the expected price of the item is simply the expected value of the S a + 1st highest of B a draws from a uniform distribution. It is straightforward to show the expected price on site a is
Thus, the payo¤ to a seller on this site is
The payo¤ to a buyer is equal to her expected surplus-the di¤erence between her willingness to pay and the expected price paid times the probability of receiving an item. Conditional on receiving an item, a buyer's expected willingness to pay is simply E vjv > v Sa+1:Ba ; where v Sa+1:Ba is the realized price from the uniform price auction on site a: Adopting the notation of Ellison et al., this expectation is
Note that f Sa+1:Ba (x) is a Beta density with parameters r = B a S a and s = S a + 1: Further, the expectation of a random variable x under these parameters is
Ba Sa
Ba+1 ; hence,
Finally, the buyer's probability of receiving an object is equal to the seller-buyer ratio on the site since buyers are ex ante identical. Thus, the probability a buyer receives an object is simply S a =B a and 6 hence, a buyer's expected payo¤ is This implies that, in any quasi-equilibrium, the di¤erence in seller-buyer ratios across the sites is small, amounting to no more than the change to^ a with one additional buyer and one fewer seller on the site. As we showed above, for all practical purposes, the e¤ect of such a change is negligible in large markets. This implies:
Hypothesis 2 (Buyer-Seller Ratio Equalization) If eBay and Yahoo are coexisting in equilibrium, then the average number of buyers per seller on each site should be approximately equal.
In the remainder of the paper, we describe the experimental design and the data set collected through a series of …eld experiments, and use the data to test our two hypotheses empirically.
Experimental Design
The presence, size and services of eBay and Yahoo Auctions provide us with the opportunity to test directly the hypotheses described above. It is reasonable to argue that eBay is familiar to most internet-users, and the brand name "Yahoo" is certainly well-known. 3 While small relative to eBay, Both eBay and Yahoo use a second-price auction mechanism with sequential bidding and a private maximum bid. Participants submit a bid indicating their willingness to pay for the item, and the auction is won by the bidder who submits the highest bid. Current price is set at the second-highest bidder's maximum bid plus some small increment, and is updated as new high bids are received. 6 When a nontrivial opening bid is speci…ed, the …rst bidder's standing price is the seller-speci…ed opening value. The next bidder to bid higher than the …rst bidder's maximum bid faces the standing price of the …rst bidder's maximum bid. The auction continues similarly until time elapses, or the ending criterion is reached. All eBay auctions have a …xed ending time. Yahoo auctions allow sellers to also choose the auction ending rule. The hard-close ending rule speci…es an exact time at which 4 Many items available on eBay are not listed on Yahoo. Moreover, the Yahoo-eBay listing ratio for collectible coins does not hold across all common item categories; on March 12, 2005, Yahoo-eBay ratios were approximately 1:3, 1:6 and 1:20 for antique books, antique …rearms and collectible beanie babies, respectively. Note that the quality of many collectibles is not systematically established as it is with graded coins, making direct product and price comparisons between the sites di¢ cult. While suggesting that relative market thickness is not consistent across product categories, these overall di¤erences between the sites do not detract from the remarkable results outlined below. 5 Throughout the experiments, Yahoo fees were two-part; listing fees were based on the starting price of the sale item, ranging from $0.05 for low-value items to $0.75 for prices over $50, and the …nal value fee was 2 percent of the …nal value up to $25 and 1 percent of the remaining closing price. Reserve fees were $0.40 or $0.75 depending on chosen value. eBay fees were higher than Yahoo's fees. eBay listing fees ranged from $0.30 to $4.80, and the …nal value fee was 5.75 percent of the initial $25 and 2.75 percent of the remaining value up to $1,000. Reserve fees were $1 or $2 depending on the chosen reserve. eBay also charged for displaying more than one photo ($0.15 each), highlights, borders and other display options.
To compare site fees, consider listing a coin with three photos, no reserve and a $50 starting price that sells for $100. Yahoo fees would amount to $2, while eBay would collect $6.08 from the sale.the auction will end. The soft-close ending rule allows for the automatic extension of the auction by …ve minutes if a bid is placed close to the auction end. On the Yahoo item description screen, a small ending rule indicator appears under the Auction Information Notes (see Figure 1 for the Yahoo screenshot). 7 
The Field Experiments
The online experiments conducted on eBay and Yahoo were designed to address the two hypotheses Table 1 , were purchased from a coin dealer in Southern California. Prior to purchase, the coins were professionally graded and sealed by the Numismatic Guaranty Corporation of America. Each encapsulated coin was marked with the coin's date, denomination, grade, and identi…cation number. Table 1 lists the prices that we paid the coin dealer, as well as the "book value" of the coin as posted by the Professional Coin Grading Service (PCGS) on August 1, 2004. The book value is an estimate of the retail price of each coin, compiled from various sources including dealer advertisements in trade papers, dealer …xed price lists, signi…cant auctions, and activity at major coin shows. Notice that the book value of each of our coins is higher than our purchase price.
The choice of coins for these experiments was strategic; the coins are popular, yet not particularly rare, collectibles. That is, the market is thick enough to limit the e¤ect of these auctions on market prices. Furthermore, the relative common nature of the auctions was unlikely to reveal these auctions as …eld experiments. 8 Coin experts may have more insight into valuations than non-experts, but not to the extent that casual buyers cannot establish their own valuations for the objects.
We created the online auctions by …rst logging into the sites with a user identi…cation name and password. Selecting the option to "Sell", we entered the sellers'interface to create the item description pages. 9 All coins were sold with nearly identical descriptions, varying only by coin age and rating, with three detailed digital photographs of the encapsulated coin. 10 All auctions were seven days in length. Both eBay and Yahoo auction websites allow sellers to choose the opening bid value as well as a secret reserve price for an item. No secret reserve price was selected. Instead, opening bid values were modi…ed to test high-reserve e¤ects. Shipping and handling charges (totaling approximately $1.30 for US addresses) were free to buyers in all auctions.
For the …eld experiments, we divided the coins into "batches", each comprised of the eight di¤erent Morgan and Peace silver dollars identi…ed in Table 1 . In total, we conducted eighty-eight auctions (or, equivalently, 11 batches) for this study. All the coins in a given batch were auctioned using the same site, ending rule, and reserve. Thus, our treatments consist of varying the identity of the site, the ending rule, and the reserve price. This paired design allows for comparison both between sites holding reserve price and ending rule constant, and within sites varying reserve price and ending rule. Baseline. In our baseline comparison, we test the predictions of Hypotheses 1 and 2 in the simplest possible fashion. That is, we auctioned two batches of coins on Yahoo and three batches on eBay specifying a hard close and zero reserve on both sites. 11 High Reserve. While treatments were held constant within each batch of coins, we conducted auctions with zero and positive reserve values to examine Hypotheses 1 and 2 in the presence of a signi…cant reserve price. Starting prices in positive-reserve auctions were equal to 70 percent of the purchase price of the coins from the dealer. Two batches of coins where auctioned on Yahoo and two batches on eBay under this high-reserve treatment. 12 Ending Rule. Ockenfels and Roth (2006) suggest that ending rule may a¤ect auction revenue.
Yahoo o¤ers sellers the choice between a hard and soft close, while eBay o¤ers only a hard close. Thus, in principle, di¤erences across the sites could be attributable to our use of the possibly "inferior"hard close on Yahoo in the baseline treatment. To investigate this possibility, we conducted fours batches of zero-reserve auctions on Yahoo-two batches were auctioned using the hard close and two using the soft-close ending rule. We also sold two batches of auctions on Yahoo with a 70 percent reserve price-one using the hard close and the other using the soft-close ending rule.
Both Yahoo and eBay sites maintain reputation ratings for registered users. Reputation values re ‡ect users' reviews from previous transactions; positive feedback increases a user's rating by one point, while negative feedback reduces the rating by one point. Since previous studies have identi…ed reputation e¤ects on sales (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002) , the seller's name and reputation rating was identical for all items auctioned on each site. Seller reputation values were reasonably high on both sites at 87 and 245 for Yahoo and eBay, respectively. The data set was constructed from information gathered from auction bidding history …les. Both Yahoo and eBay sites allow users to view summaries of auction activities, including bids, bidders' usernames and, on eBay only, all bidders' reputation ratings. Yahoo lists only winning bidders'reputation ratings.
The auctions were posted online on Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday evenings. Yahoo and eBay's planning feature allows sellers to schedule auction starts in advance, allowing all auctions in a batch to be posted at approximately the same time. The …eld experiments were monitored only through the seller's portal to ensure that pageview counts were not a¤ected. Upon auction completion, the item information page and the bidding history page were saved electronically to preserve the results. All items were shipped promptly to the winners.
Unlike …eld data retrieved from online auctions where results are potentially confounded by unobserved heterogeneities and where the auction "rules" (such as ending time, duration, and opening bid) are endogenous, our …eld experiments ensure the consistency of product quality and online descriptions, shipping fees, seller's name and reputation value, and auction length. The matched-pair design allows for direct comparison between the treatment groups, exploiting the homogeneity of the auctioned item pairs and directly addressing the testable hypotheses outlined above. The following section highlights the important results of the statistical analysis.
Results

Descriptive Statistics
Pooling auctions by site, Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the experiments. As the table indicates, the average revenues and numbers of bidders were higher on eBay compared to Yahoo under all treatments. Consistent with auction theory, the presence of a reserve price raises revenues and reduces the average number of bidders on both sites. A typical bidder made between 1 and 2 bids for a given coin over the course of the auction, with a slightly higher incidence of multiple bidding on eBay compared to Yahoo. Winning bidders tended to be quite experienced with average feedback 13 scores of approximately 263 on eBay and 232 on Yahoo. Unlike many auctions on eBay, the winning bidder in this market was less likely to be a "sniper" (a user who submits bids in the closing seconds of the auction); the last bid by the winning bidder was entered an average of 296 minutes (almost …ve hours) before the close of the auction on eBay and 1050 minutes (17.5 hours) before the close on Yahoo. On average, we received 9.38 bids for coins sold on eBay and 7.88 bids for coins sold on Yahoo.
Equilibrium Coexistence
We begin our empirical analysis by examining the equilibrium coexistence hypotheses for Yahoo and eBay. Our …eld experiments provide us with a rich data set consisting of observed bid values and times, bidder names and feedback levels, as well as other auction attributes from the 88 auctions.
Note that …ve Yahoo auctions …nished without a sale and were subsequently dropped from the data. 13 Table 3 summarizes the revenues and the number of unique bidders per auction for the two sites, aggregated by coin type. 14 Of course, Table 3 is merely suggestive of signi…cant di¤erences in the revenues and the number of bidders per auction across the two sites. Next, we test Hypotheses 1 and 2 formally using econometric techniques. Let revenue air denote the revenue obtained from an auction held at site a for coin i under treatment r: Similarly, let bidders air be likewise de…ned as the number of bidders participating in a particular auction.
Hypothesis 1: Price Equalization
Hypothesis 1 suggests the following econometric speci…cation:
where site air is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the auction occurs on eBay and zero when the auction occurs on Yahoo. The variable X ir represents a matrix of controls associated with an auction for coin i under treatment r: Our matrix of controls may include the following variables, depending on the speci…cation:
Book Value -We use the PCGS book values to control for variation in retail demand for the coins.
Dealer Price -We use the price we paid for each of the coins to re ‡ect the fact that revenue will re ‡ect, at least partially, the costs of acquisition.
Reserve -We use a dummy variable, set equal to one under the high reserve treatment, to re ‡ect the theoretical possibility that reserve price a¤ects revenue (see, for instance, Myerson (1981) ).
Ending Rule -We use an ending rule dummy variable, set equal to one when an auction ends at a …xed time (i.e. hard close), to re ‡ect the possibility that ending rule a¤ects revenue (see Ockenfels and Roth (2006)).
Item Dummies -In versions of speci…cation (1) ; we include dummy variables for each of the coins auctioned. The inclusion of these dummies allows for unobserved heterogeneity by coin type apart from book value and costs. For instance, if the popularity of a coin changed between the time of our purchase and subsequent sale, an item dummy variable for that coin would capture this variation.
Finally, the expression " air represents a standard error term. To control for heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are reported. 15 In Appendix A, we report the results of speci…cations where, instead of using item dummies, we postulate that the error term contains a coin-speci…c random e¤ect. We perform Hausman tests to examine the appropriateness of our random e¤ects speci…cation and fail to reject the null hypothesis for all models-the use of the random e¤ects speci…cation appears justi…ed. As Appendix A shows, our results are substantially una¤ected by the inclusion of random e¤ects.
The theory described in Section 2 suggests that revenues should be approximately equal between the sites. That is, Hypothesis 1 predicts that the site coe¢ cient is zero ( 1 = 0) under speci…cation (1).
Hypothesis 2: Buyer-Seller Ratio Equalization
Hypothesis 2 suggests the following econometric speci…cation:
where the right-hand side variables are de…ned identically to equation (1) : Hypothesis 2 of the theory model also predicts that the site coe¢ cient is zero ( 1 = 0) in this speci…cation. Of course, equations
(1) and (2) assume that any shift in the price level associated with using a given site is constant for all coins. Given the wide variation in the coin prices, one might worry that such a speci…cation is overly restrictive. Accordingly, we also examine equivalent speci…cations of equations (1) and (2) where the dependent variable is ln (revenue air ) and ln (bidders air ), respectively: For these cases, the site coe¢ cient, 1 ; represents the percentage change in revenue or number of bidders per auction.
Once again, the theory model predicts that 1 = 0.
Baseline Table 4 displays the results of the regression speci…cations under the baseline treatment-auctions with a low reserve price and a hard close. Model 1 presents the coe¢ cients associated with equation
(1) with book value and dealer price controls. Model 2 presents results with coin dummies in lieu of cost and book value controls. Model 3 presents the log speci…cation of Model 2. Models 4 to 6 are the analogous speci…cations for equation (2).
As Table 4 indicates, eBay auctions yield signi…cantly higher revenues than the equivalent auctions conducted on the Yahoo site. Not only can we reject the hypothesis that 1 = 0 at the 1 percent signi…cance level, but the economic magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates is substantial. For instance, Table 4 implies that a $1 increase in the dealer price is associated with a 99 cent increase in the sale price. In contrast, book value has little explanatory power. Not only are the book value coe¢ cients not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, but the economic magnitudes are quite small. Interestingly, neither item cost nor book value appear to have much e¤ect on the number of bidders attracted to an auction. As Model 4 of Table 4 shows, the economic magnitude of these coe¢ cients is small and neither rise to statistical signi…cance at conventional levels.
High Reserve
How does the presence of a reserve price a¤ect revenues? One possible cause of the signi…cant di¤erences between the revenues and numbers of bidders per auction on eBay and Yahoo is that the reserve price is non-optimally set, and that this seller "mistake" has a greater e¤ect on Yahoo than on eBay. To address this potential explanation, we pool the results of the hard-close auctions across the two sites and include a dummy variable to indicate positive reserve values. The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 5 . First, notice that the inclusion of auctions with a positive reserve price has little impact on the magnitude or signi…cance of the site-related coe¢ cients. Once again, we can reject the hypothesis implied by the theory that 1 = 0 at the 1 percent signi…cance levelcoe¢ cient estimates suggest that running auctions on eBay leads to 29.3 percent higher revenues and attracts 2.124 more bidders than the equivalent Yahoo auction. Table 5 also reveals that the presence of a reserve price plays a signi…cant role in auction outcomes.
In Models 1 to 3, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cient associated with the positive reserve is equal to zero at the 5 percent signi…cance level; coe¢ cient estimates suggest that a positive reserve price increases revenues by approximately 7 percent. The e¤ect of a positive reserve price on the number of bidders is consistent with theoretical predictions and statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1 percent signi…cance level. Coe¢ cients estimates for the number of bidders speci…cation indicate that positive reserve prices successfully screen certain bidders-a 70-percent reserve price attracts approximately 2.8 fewer bidders than a low reserve price.
The inclusion of a 70-percent reserve price in Table 5 does not alter our earlier conclusions about the di¤erences in revenues and numbers of bidders across sites. In fact, the coe¢ cient estimates of the revenue di¤erence across sites vary little from those in Table 4 . Moreover, the hypothesis of the coexistence theory-that 1 = 0-is rejected at the 1 percent signi…cance level in all of the models.
Ending Rule
Failing to explain the large revenue and bidder count disparity with the reserve price treatments, we turn to the e¤ect of the ending rule on revenues. The theoretical rationale for di¤erences in bid timing stemming from di¤erences in the auction ending rule, described in Ockenfels and Roth (2006) , implies that revenues may be higher under a soft close than under a hard-close rule. 16 In principle, since Yahoo allows sellers to select a soft close while eBay does not, the di¤erence in the revenues across the two sites could be attributed to the fact that the hard-close auctions run on Yahoo are "inferior"
to those run by a sophisticated seller aware of the importance of the ending rule. Accordingly, we run speci…cations analogous to equations (1) and (2) ; but con…ne our attention to auctions conducted on Yahoo. Table 6 displays the results of this analysis. Notice that the coe¢ cient associated with the ending rule is not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in any of the six models. Moreover, the economic magnitude of the coe¢ cients is small. For instance, the coe¢ cient estimate in Model 2 of Table 6 indicates that revenue increases by less than half of one percent when a seller selects the soft close over the hard-close rule. In short, there is little evidence that the eBay-Yahoo revenue di¤erences are a¤ected by the ending rule in this setting.
In addition to …nding no revenue or number of bidder e¤ects associated with the ending rule, we also investigate the e¤ect of the ending rule on bid timing as well. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) report that late bidding occurs with much greater frequency in auctions with a hard close than in auctions with a soft close. To investigate this possibility, we examine the following speci…cation for the Yahoo auctions:
where bid_time ir is the time in minutes between the instant a particular bid was placed and the time that the auction ended. The variable endingrule is the dummy variable described above. The matrix X ir includes dummy variables for each of the coin types as well as the reserve treatment. As usual, we use robust estimation to account for heteroskedasticity in the data.
If bid timing were a¤ected by the ending rule in a manner consistent with the theory and …ndings of Roth and Ockenfels, we would expect the coe¢ cient 1 to be negative. The null hypothesis is, of course, that ending rule has no e¤ect. The results of the estimation of equation (3) are reported in Table 7 using two measures of the dependent variable. In Model 1, we examine the timing of last bids only. That is, if a bidder entered multiple bids in a given auction, we take only the timing of his last bid as representing his true bid timing. As Model 1 of Table 7 shows, the coe¢ cient estimate for 1 is in the direction consistent with Roth and Ockenfels results (bidders bid an average of 223 minutes later, all else equal); however, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 1 = 0 at conventional signi…cance levels. Model 2 of Table 7 includes the timing of all bids. Again, the coe¢ cient estimate 
Pooled Results
Finally, we examine the e¤ect of site on revenue and number of bidders for all treatments. The results of these "pooled"regressions are displayed in Table 8 . Once again, we reject the theory model prediction that site has no e¤ect on revenue or number of bidders at the 1 percent signi…cance level for all models. The results indicate that eBay listings lead to a 29.6 percent increase in revenues and attract 58.3 percent more bidders than Yahoo listings. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the implications of the theoretical model of eBay and Yahoo coexistence.
To summarize:
1. In all speci…cations, the coe¢ cient estimates suggest that auctioning a given coin on eBay yields approximately 29 percent higher revenues than auctioning the same coin on Yahoo. This is inconsistent with the equilibrium coexistence theory.
2. In all speci…cations, the coe¢ cient estimates suggest that approximately two more bidders per seller bid on a given coin auctioned on eBay than bid on an identical coin auctioned on the Yahoo site. This is also inconsistent with the equilibrium coexistence theory.
3. In all speci…cations, the coe¢ cient estimates suggest that ending rule choice (hard close versus soft close) a¤ects neither revenues nor the number of bidders in an auction for a given coin on the Yahoo site. This is di¤erent from the …ndings of Roth and Ockenfels (2002) 
Alternative Hypotheses
While the results are inconsistent with the stark model of equilibrium coexistence contained in Ellison, et al., that model abstracts away from a number of factors which might possibly reconcile our results with equilibrium coexistence. We examine the following alternatives:
1. Platform Di¤erentiation. While the theory model postulates that sites do not di¤er from one
another in inherent quality, some have suggested that eBay's platform o¤ers superior service compared to Yahoo and that this might account for the revenue di¤erences.
2. Switching Costs. The theory model assumes that it is costless for buyers and sellers to switch between platforms. As a practical matter, there are frictions in moving between auction sites.
Perhaps lock-in, in the form of switching costs, accounts for our results.
3. Reputational Di¤erences. In the theory model, seller reputation was inconsequential to buyers.
A large existing literature, however, suggests that reputation does matter a great deal. Perhaps sellers on eBay simply have superior reputations relative to Yahoo sellers, and this accounts for the site di¤erences.
4. Anomalous Data. Our study focused on 88 auctions at a particular point in time. Perhaps with either a larger number of auctions or a di¤erent time period, the observed revenue di¤erences would disappear.
Platform Di¤erentiation The hypotheses we tested were derived under the assumption that the competing sites were homogeneous-given the same number of buyers and sellers on the two sites, a buyer (or seller) derives the same payo¤s from using the eBay site as from using the Yahoo site. Of Can platforms coexist in equilibrium when they are vertically di¤erentiated and the number of buyers and sellers is large? Can the price di¤erences observed in the data be rationalized through vertically di¤erentiated platforms? The following propositions establish that the answer in both cases is no. Speci…cally, suppose that the eBay site is vertically di¤erentiated from the Yahoo site. That is, q S 1 and q B 1 with strict inequality for either q B or q S . Proposition 1 shows that coexistence is impossible when markets are large.
Proposition 1 As the number of buyers and sellers grows arbitrarily large, the fraction of buyers and sellers at one of the sites goes to zero.
Proposition 1 implies that, when sites are vertically di¤erentiated and the number of buyers and sellers grows large, only "tipping"equilibria remain. It is silent about the direction of tipping or what happens outside of the limit. Suppose that we consider the case for large, but …nite, numbers of buyers and sellers, and restrict attention to equilibria in which both sites are active. Again, the addition of vertical di¤erentiation does not help to rationalize the observed results. Speci…cally, for the two sites to coexist under these conditions, it must be the case that the majority of buyers and sellers locate 21 at the inferior site, i.e., on Yahoo. The intuition for this seemingly counterintuitive result is that the scale e¤ect must compensate for the vertical di¤erentiation advantage of eBay; hence, for buyers and sellers to be approximately indi¤erent between the two sites, it must be that Yahoo enjoys signi…cant scale advantages. Formally, Proposition 2 When there are a su¢ ciently large number of buyers and sellers, fewer than half of each visit the eBay site. Formally, for N su¢ ciently large, in any interior quasi-equilibrium,
where is the ratio of sellers to buyers.
The proofs of both of these propositions are contained in Appendix B and use essentially the same equilibrium arguments as in the baseline model of Ellison, et al. The main conclusion to be drawn is that the introduction of vertical di¤erentiation is not su¢ cient to rationalize the coexistence of the two sites with the results of the …eld experiments.
Switching Costs Results from the …eld experiments suggest that, free from other motives or constraints, rational buyers should switch to Yahoo and rational sellers switch to eBay until the gains from switching approach zero. In practice, however, there may be constraints on switching and switching costs may not be small. For instance, a seller with an established reputation (feedback rating) on one site may be loath to undertake the costs of rebuilding this reputation after switching to another site. Likewise, a buyer with successful purchase experience on one site may be reluctant to "test" the reliability of sellers on an alternate site. More mundanely, a buyer already participating on one site may simply be unwilling to expend the "hassle cost" of …lling out the necessary forms to participate on the other site. Since the theoretical model generating Hypotheses 1 and 2 assumed zero switching costs, it could be the case that, in the presence of signi…cant switching costs, the revenue di¤erences observed above are still consistent with equilibrium coexistence. In this section, we investigate whether these factors can account for the revenue di¤erences across the two sites.
A straightforward explanation for the observed revenue di¤erences is that signi…cant numbers of eBay buyers and Yahoo sellers are simply unaware that the other service exists-the e¤ective switching cost for these ignorant buyers and sellers is in…nite. However, searches on several popular online search engines provides some evidence that both Yahoo and eBay are easy to "…nd"on the Internet; searches for keywords "auction," "internet auction" and "online auction" put Yahoo and eBay in the top …ve results for Google and Yahoo search services. 17 If the …eld experiment participants were all novice
Internet users, then we could speculate that a search engine directed them to either eBay or Yahoo, and that they were unaware of other options. Yet, with average Yahoo and eBay feedback values of 232:1 and 242:5, respectively, the majority of auction participants are quite experienced users. 18 Therefore, the argument that many eBay users are ignorant in terms of service selection seems unconvincing.
Moreover, while one might plausibly argue that the lesser-known status of Yahoo's auction service makes it e¤ectively "invisible"for eBay buyers, it seems hard to imagine that Yahoo sellers are simply unaware of eBay.
Even if aware of the alternatives, high switching costs could prevent users from moving their business between eBay and Yahoo. The cost of registration alone is low; on both sites, users complete identi…cation information forms and select a username and password. Yahoo simpli…es its sign-up process by allowing individuals with Yahoo e-mail addresses to bypass the personal information page of user registration. Given the size of the revenue di¤erences in Table 7 , for an individual buyer interested in a coin in our auctions to be dissuaded from signing up at the Yahoo site, the "hassle cost" would have to exceed $15-this seems implausibly high. Put di¤erently, since it takes around one minute to …ll out the Yahoo registration form, the opportunity cost of time for this buyer would have to exceed $900 per hour.
While registration is not costly in terms of time or e¤ort, some users may feel invested in terms of their reputation (feedback rating) on a site. In general, buyers' reputations matter little, since the seller can hold the item until payment is received. However, it is quite reasonable to argue that our bidders may also be sellers in the collectible coin market. 19 From a bidder's perspective, high
seller reputation values may signal quality and reliability. Feedback points can be gained through both selling and purchasing activities and are not allocated based on the value of the transaction.
That is, users may boost their rating through many low-value transactions; successfully completing 10 one-dollar purchases is indistinguishable from the completion of 10 one-thousand-dollar transactions.
In addition, the auction services promote positive ratings by simply subtracting negative from positive feedback, despite negative ratings being rarer and more informative (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002) .
Casually, however, it seems plausible that if users place some value on positive feedback scores, then rebuilding reputation stocks after switching auction services could be costly.
When one considers the magnitude of the price disparity, this argument becomes much weaker. If the disparity were mere cents, then the reputation argument might seem more convincing. However, with 20 to 60 percent premiums, reputation would need to be extremely valuable to deter switching.
Consider a user with a reputation value of 100 on eBay who is considering switching to Yahoo. Since
Yahoo lists many items valued at or below $1 (often with the option to buy immediately without bidding), the user could rebuild his reputation for approximately $100. With the average eBay-Yahoo price disparity, if he purchases seven Yahoo coins, the user's savings have more than o¤set switching costs. 20 In fact, Brown and Morgan (forthcoming) identify a market on eBay whose sole purpose is the "manufacture"of reputation for users. Trading seemingly-valueless items such as ebooks and publicly available digital photographs for pennies in this market, a user could arti…cially enhance (or rebuild)
her 100-point reputation for approximately $1-a tiny fraction of the values of the coins we sold on the sites. Clearly, this assumes user preferences over reputation on a site, but not the site itself.
Reputational Di¤erences Neither eBay nor Yahoo endorses the reliability of their sellers, yet, is it possible that eBay bidders simply do not trust Yahoo or its members? Perhaps Yahoo sellers have a reputation for failing to deliver products, or selling damaged or counterfeit goods. Are eBay bidders paying a premium to avoid default? In fact, several online reviews from individual buyers characterized Yahoo sellers as fraudulent, blaming Yahoo's perceived inaction on abuse claims (for example, see Ciao, 2005) . However, searches for eBay-related complaints yield similar results. 21 Using the data collected from our …eld experiments, we calculate the implied default rate needed to deter switching. Suppose an individual is indi¤erent between eBay and Yahoo purchases when the following expression holds with equality:
where U g is the utility associated with a successful Yahoo transaction, U b is the utility from a Yahoo 2 0 Insu¢ cient purchases to recoup switching costs does not appear to be relevant for many participants. Only 4 of the 31 eBay winners had not recently participated in a coin-related auction. The 27 active collectors had purchased between 2 and 76 coins during the month of March 2005, alone. 2 1 Google searches for "eBay rip o¤" (omitting the term "Yahoo") and "Yahoo auction rip o¤" (omitting the term "eBay") revealed 725,000 and 234,000 results, respectively (July 26, 2005) .
transaction that results in total loss, U e is the utility from a (always) successful eBay purchase, and , the default rate, is the probability that a Yahoo purchase will result in total loss.
To model a consumer's expected utility from a given transactions, we follow the experimental auction literature (see Cox et al., 1988) and assume that consumers have constant relative risk aversion utility functions,
where 2 [0; 1) is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, w is total wealth, and risk neutrality is a nested case ( = 0): In this case, utilities may be de…ned as follows:
where W is the initial wealth level of the individual. According to the 2000 census, the median household wealth in the US is $55,000 (US Census Bureau, 2005). Likely on the lower end of the wealth distribution for the online coin-collecting group, this wealth estimate leads to very conservative implied default rates. That is, higher household wealth would result in even higher and less-dispersed default rates. We estimate V as the PCGS book value for the coins, and P e and P y as the average revenue by coin by site (Table 2) .
Varying , implied default rates range from 12 percent ( = 0:9;coin 1) to 19 percent ( = 0:1; coin 8). The average variance of by coin is 0.002. Averaging across all coins, is 17.6 percent. That is, for a bidder to be indi¤erent between the sites, he would need to believe that one of six transactions would result in total loss. 22 Even if this is a reasonable estimate of Yahoo sellers'trustworthiness, it 2 2 Modeling lower household wealth levels is illustrative. Household wealth levels below $100 and risk aversion coe¢ cients approaching = 1 are required to achieve default rates below 10 percent for some coins. Yet, even with implausibly-low wealth levels and extreme risk aversion coe¢ cients, overall implied default rates average nearly 12 percent across the eight coin types. We modeled higher household wealth levels as well; when W = $200; 000, average was approximately 18 percent for all values of the risk aversion coe¢ cient.
is not an equilibrium explanation. No credible signal exists for reliable sellers, as both good and bad sellers are motivated to switch to eBay.
Anomalous Data
The remarkable price and bidder count di¤erences between eBay and Yahoo that we observe in our …eld experiments raise the questions: Are these disparities somehow artifacts of the experimental design? And, do these di¤erences persist beyond the experimental time frame?
To address these questions directly, we gathered data from over 25,000 Morgan and Peace series coin auctions on eBay and Yahoo in the months of April, May, June and August of 2006. We …ltered the original collection of auctions to identify those item with descriptions and grades similar to those used in our experiments to allow us to compare the experimental and …eld data. For example, from the set of auctions for 1898 Morgan dollar coins, we selected only those auctions for coins graded MS-64. As we observed on the sites during the time of experimental auctions, the market for Morgan and Peace series coins on eBay remains substantially larger than the market for these coins on Yahoo. Table 9 present summary statistics for the …eld data. We examine 1652 auctions in total; 371 coins on Yahoo and 1281 coins on eBay. Pooling the eight coin types, the mean price of the coins on eBay is $59, while the average coin price on Yahoo is $54.17. The di¤erence in means of total auction revenue across the sites suggests that the price disparity remains, and compels us to investigate more formally. The inequality of means in bid counts-on average, an eBay seller attracts more than 7 bids per auction, while Yahoo sellers receive approximately 4.5 bids per auction-is also suggestive of a persistent di¤erence in the number of bidders attracted to each auction sites.
To identify these disparities more formally, we use regression speci…cations similar to equations (1) and (2) described above. Table 10 presents the results from the regressions; models 1 and 2 regress revenue and the log of revenue, respectively, against site, coin and auction characteristics, while models 3 and 4 regress the number of bids and the log of the number of bids, respectively, against site, coin and auction characteristics. Regression coe¢ cients are all statistically signi…cant and con…rm the persistence of the revenue and bid count disparities.
Controlling for coin type and opening bid, the coe¢ cient on the site variable in models 1 and 2 suggests that coin auctions on eBay yield a $11 or 15 percent revenue premium relative to equivalent Yahoo auctions. Examining the regressions on the total number of bids received per auction, we conclude that eBay auctions attracted approximately 2 more bidders per seller than comparable Yahoo auctions-controlling for other item and auction related observables, this is equivalent to 26 approximately 70 percent more bids per seller on eBay relative to Yahoo. 23 The …eld data suggests that the observed revenue and bid count di¤erences were not an artifact of our particular experimental design or the time at which the experiments were conducted. The di¤erences between the two sites seem to be persistent and systematic.
Conclusion
We have shown that there are signi…cant di¤erences in revenues and number of bidder per seller for identical items sold on eBay and Yahoo auctions-an observation that is inconsistent with equilibrium coexistence of the two sites. Even if one accounts for additional considerations such as service di¤erences between the sites, switching costs, and general reputation e¤ects, one cannot reconcile our results with a theory of equilibrium coexistence.
Thus, we are left with a puzzle: This revenue disparity arguably represents an opportunity for arbitrage between the sites. Agents could purchase the relatively inexpensive coins on Yahoo and sell them on eBay for the relatively higher price, taking advantage of the price spread to earn, on average, a 20 to 70 percent pro…t. While switching costs might reduce this pro…t somewhat, in our view, the arbitrage opportunity remains.
The possibility of persistent arbitrage opportunities in other areas, such as securities, has not gone unnoticed in the literature. Finance theory has suggested that potential arbitrageurs may be reluctant to exploit some opportunities due to the large …xed costs and capital outlays (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, if there is uncertainty about the distribution of returns from arbitrage activities, especially the mean, price disparities may persist until potential arbitrageurs determine whether their expected payo¤s are su¢ cient to cover their …xed costs (Mitchell, Pulvino and Sta¤ord, 2002) . In this case, however, the relatively low capital requirements, as well as the fact that the Yahoo coins sold consistently for less than the eBay coins, make these no-arbitrage arguments less compelling.
So what is going on? Our view is that we are witnessing a market in the process of tipping. 2 3 In our discussion of the …eld experiment data earlier in the paper, we introduced the number of bidders per seller as the variable of interest. However, due to data constraints, unique bidder counts per auction are not available for our …eld data. Instead, we use the number of bids per auction to proxy for the buyer-seller ratio. To alleviate concerns about potential bias in this proxy, consider the following: according to results from our …eld experiments, the average number of bids per bidder on eBay and Yahoo are 1.56 and 1.98, respectively (see Table 1 ). Were these bids per bidder statistics equal, we could describe the total bid count as simply a transformation of the total bidder count. Instead, because individual Yahoo bidders tend to submit fewer bids, our total bid counts actually underestimate the di¤erence in buyer-seller ratios on eBay and Yahoo. That is, our statistical estimate of bidder count disparity in the …eld data is actually a conservative measure of the gap. been interpreted, in isolation, as renewed e¤orts to …ght eBay's auction dominance, the change in the formal relationship between the …rms suggests that Yahoo has simply conceded the auction game to eBay and is focusing its business e¤orts away from auctions and towards its search and advertising services. In short, it suggests a market which has already tipped. 
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Proof. Fix the ratio of sellers to buyers at < 1 and consider equilibria as the number of buyers N ! 1: For a given number of buyers, N; an equilibrium is described by the pair fS y (N ) ; B y (N )g.
Suppose that, contrary to the proposition, there exists a sequence of equilibria fS y (N ) ; B y (N )g such that fS y (N )g is convergent while the rest diverge. To con…rm this, suppose that fS a (N )g 1 N =1 was convergent for one of the sites. In that case, buyers using that site earn zero payo¤s in the limit when they could earn positive payo¤s from switching to the other site. This is a contradiction. Similarly, if fB a (N )g 1 N =1 is convergent for one of the sites, then sellers on that site earn zero payo¤s in the limit and have a pro…table deviation as well. QED Proposition 2 When there are a su¢ ciently large number of buyers and sellers, fewer than half of each visit the eBay site. Formally, for N su¢ ciently large, in any interior quasi-equilibrium, B e (N ) < Proof. To establish the proposition, we will show that there are no equilibria in which a …nite number of buyers and sellers go to the Yahoo site in the limit. This implies that, for all interior equilibrium sequences, the share of buyers and sellers on the eBay site becomes vanishingly small as N gets large. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a limit equilibrium in which a …nite number of buyers and sellers go to the Yahoo site while the rest go to eBay. In such a limit equilibrium, it must be that 
